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The End of the Home Affordable
Modification Program and the Start of
a New Problem
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 financial crisis wreaked havoc on the U.S.
housing market. “At the end of 2010, 23.1 percent of all U.S.
homeowners with a mortgage owed more on their homes than
[what] their homes were worth.”1 Responding to the housing
crisis, “Congress . . . enacted manifold legislation” starting in
2008.2 Congress began by passing the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which allowed the Secretary
of the Treasury to enact a plan to reduce foreclosures in the
United States by establishing programs to identify and assist
homeowners facing impending foreclosures.3 The EESA was
drafted with the goal of aiding homeowners and combating
economic instability; however, the programs implemented under
1 SeeMichael Snyder, 27 Depressing Facts About the Housing Crash That Never




2 Linda Elizabeth Coco, “Foaming the Runway” for Homeowners: U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts “Preserving Homeownership” in the Wake of the Home Affordable
Modification Program, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 421, 421 (2015); see also Statistics
and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics
[https://perma.cc/9UZ8-L5KV] (detailing statistics of bills and resolutions introduced or
enacted in each two-year Congress).
3 See Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 228–29 (1st Cir. 2013);
12 U.S.C. § 5219(a)(1) (“To the extent that the Secretary acquires mortgages, mortgage
backed securities, and other assets secured by residential real estate, including
multifamily housing, the Secretary shall implement a plan that seeks to maximize
assistance for homeowners and use the authority of the Secretary to encourage the
servicers of the underlying mortgages, considering net present value to the taxpayer, to
take advantage of the HOPE for Homeowners Program under section 1715z–23 of this
title or other available programs to minimize foreclosures. In addition, the Secretary
may use loan guarantees and credit enhancements to facilitate loan modifications to
prevent avoidable foreclosures.”).
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the act have proven to be more beneficial to banks and financial
institutions than to the homeowners themselves.4
One such program, the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP), was established by the Secretary of the
Treasury in 2009.5 HAMP was the largest program to come out
of ESSA.6 The Secretary of the Treasury’s central goal in
enacting HAMPwas to minimize foreclosures.7 The programwas
designed to help homeowners in distress and set out
qualification requirements.8 The combination of these aimless
requirements, poor accessibility, and ill-conceived incentives,
amongst other things, proved to limit the program’s availability
to homeowners throughout the United States.9
HAMP assisted homeowners by effectuating a decrease
in their mortgage payments.10 Rather than the original mortgage
payment plans, underHAMP, homeowners’ paymentswere capped
at a percentage of their respective incomes.11 Nevertheless, not
4 See Coco, supra note 2, at 421−22.
5 See Making Home Affordable, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Pages/
default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3FZ2-627P].
6 SeeHomeAffordableModification Program (HAMP), U.S.DEP’TOFTREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Pag
es/hamp.aspx [https://perma.cc/6LVP-LBWS].
7 Jonathan A. Marcantel, Enforcing the Home Affordable Modification
Program, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 121, 124 (2014).
8 The requirements included, amongst other things, homeowners to be facing
a long-term hardship, be behind on mortgage payments or likely to fall behind, have a
mortgage that originated before January 1, 2009, and have adequate income. The
program demanded additional requirements such as maximum limits on the amount a
homeowner could owe under the program in addition to proof that modified payments
could be made on a timely basis. See Loan Modification Programs: How to Qualify and
Apply, HOMEOWNERSHIP, http://www.homeownership.org/foreclosure-help/loan-modification-
programs/ [https://perma.cc/E6VD-G3X9].
9 See HAMP: Home Loan Modification Program Information, ZILLOW,
http://www.zillow.com/mortgage-learning/hamp/ [https://perma.cc/TV8Z-R34Z] (last
visited Mar. 26, 2018) (Homeowners must “[o]we a maximum of $729,750 on [their]
primary residence or single-unit rental property or up to $934,200 on a two-unit rental
property (the government sets higher limits for rental properties with more
units) . . . [h]ave enough documented income that [they] could pay [their] mortgage[s] if
[they] w[ere] modified . . . show that they are facing ‘serious’ financial hardship such as
a loss in income, illness or a divorce that puts them at risk of defaulting on their
mortgage,” and “[t]hey must prove this hardship with documentation and sign an
affidavit to that effect.”); see also David Dayen, The Government Program That Failed
Homeowners, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
money/2014/mar/30/government-program-save-homes-mortgages-failure-banks [https://
perma.cc/F8Q8-UHGH]; Lisa Prevost,ALoanModification Program’s LimitedReach, N.Y.
TIMES: REAL ESTATE (May 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/realestate/
concerns-about-hamp-loan-modification-program.html [https://perma.cc/VJ8V-7B26].
10 Principal Reduction Alternative Under the Home Affordable Modification
Program, IRS (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/principal-reduction-alternative-
under-the-home-affordable-modification-program [https://perma.cc/KA97-XVMR].
11 Id.
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everyone eligible for the program qualified for a modification.12
Eligible homeowners were placed in a Trial Period Plan (TPP) in
which they were required to make modified, reduced payments
for a period of three months.13 At the end of the TPP, banks and
servicers had the discretion to offer a permanent modification.14
Although incentives existed for the bank and/or servicer such as
“a $1,000 payment for each permanent modification,”15 the
modification was not always implemented, leaving the
homeowner with few to no options other than foreclosure.16
HAMP proved ineffective in reaching homeowners who
needed assistance. HAMP’s original goal was to restructure
three to four million homeowner mortgages by the program’s
original deadline of December 31, 2012; however, as of December
2016, HAMP assisted just 1.6 million homeowners with
permanent loan modifications.17 This note suggests
transforming the program’s strategy by building upon the small
areas in which the program had seen success and re-
implementing a revolutionized program utilizing the remaining
budget. Congress should reinvent HAMP while strengthening
the series of guidelines within HAMP, replacing them with
mandates. In order to create an effective program, Congress
must focus on establishing a program with the following five key
principles: efficiency, affordability, accessibility, accountability,
and enforceability. These principles, focused on both independently
and collectively, will help replace the cracked foundationHAMPwas
built on, paving the way for an effective HAMP.
Part I of this note provides a brief overview of HAMP and
the implications of its guidelines. Part II evaluates previous
programs, discusses the various claims brought by homeowners,
and recounts significant judicial decisions that strengthened the
program by filling some of the holes within the overall plan. But
HAMP ultimately failed and Part III reviews its failures,
12 See Tammy J. Raduege, Annotation, Enforceability of Trial Period Plans (TPP)
Under the Home AffordableModification Program (HAMP), 88A.L.R.Fed. 2d331 (2014)at § 5.
13 See id. at *1.
14 See Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 229 (1st Cir. 2013).
15 Id.
16 ALYSCOHEN,ARIELLECOHEN&DIANEE.THOMPSON,NAT’LCONSUMERLAWCTR.,
AT A CROSSROADS: LESSONS FROM THEHOMEAFFORDABLEMODIFICATION PROGRAM (HAMP),
46 (2013), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/loan_mod/hamp-report-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU6U-W9XJ]; see also Renae Merle, After Helping a Fraction of
Homeowners Expected, Obama’s Foreclosure Prevention Program is Finally Ending, WASH.
POST (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/12/30/after-
helping-a-fraction-of-homeowners-expected-obamas-foreclosure-prevention-program-is-finally-
ending/?utm_term=.7c48beef27a9 [https://perma.cc/6682-LEDH].
17 BROOKINGS INST., HOMEOWNERSHIP BUILT TO LAST: BALANCING ACCESS,
AFFORDABILITY, AND RISK AFTER THE HOUSING CRISIS 423 (Eric S. Belsky, Christopher
E. Herbert & Jennifer H. Molinsky eds., 2014); Merle, supra note 16.
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touching upon key sectors where the program fell short and the
overall ineffectiveness of HAMP as a solution to the housing
crisis. Part IV discusses the federal government’s plan for “Life
After HAMP” and what has been implemented since HAMP’s
expiration on December 31, 2016.18 This Part contrasts current
implementations with proposed policies and discusses the possible
effectiveness of these solutions. Part V proposes solutions to the
lingering housing crisis and suggests legislative implementations
that should be adopted to improve the effectiveness and establish
a workable plan for “Life After HAMP.” These congressional
mandates will hold lenders accountable to complying homeowners,
creating a more efficient, accessible, and effective program overall.
I. A BRIEFOVERVIEW OF THEHOME AFFORDABLE
MODIFICATION PROGRAM
The judicial system gave strength to homeowners’ rights
under the HAMP program. Ever since the Secretary of the
Treasury enacted HAMP, there has been litigation, especially
stemming from the subsequent supplemental directives.19 The
litigation typically was, and still is, targeted towards mortgage
servicers that did not modify or renegotiate their clients’ loans
under HAMP, choosing instead to foreclose upon the property.20
HAMP was one of two prongs of the Homeowner
Affordable Stability Plan (HASP) created on February 18,
2009.21 HAMP came at a time when the U.S. economic collapse
triggered the worst recession since the Great Depression.22 The
collapse was caused by numerous factors, with a significant
element being the composition of mortgage-backed securities
being comprised of less restrictive loans.23 HAMP established a
set of guidelines for servicers and lenders of mortgage loans to
follow. These guidelines “require[d] any servicer of a loan
guaranteed or owned by a government-sponsored entity or
18 See Making Home Affordable, supra note 5.
19 Marcantel, supra note 7, at 127.
20 See infra Part II.
21 Breck Robinson, An Overview of the Home Affordable Modification Program,
CONSUMER COMPLIANCE OUTLOOK (2009), https://consumercomplianceoutlook.org/2009/
third-quarter/q3_02/ [https://perma.cc/QEL7-VCSU] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). The
other prong being the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), which was
established “to help borrowers refinance distressed mortgage loans into new loans with
lower rates.” Id.
22 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Council on
Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.: Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk (Mar.
10, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm
[https://perma.cc/6XHR-FCSA] (“The world is suffering through the worst financial crisis
since the 1930s . . . ”).
23 SeeMarcantel, supra note 7, at 122.
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insured or guaranteed by a government agency (GSE Loan) to
comply with HAMP’s Supplemental Directives and
Guidelines.”24 In essence, the guidelines prohibited foreclosure
proceedings until modification eligibility for defaulting loans
was assessed.25 This review applied to all GSE Loans
irrespective of the servicers’ consent.26 Servicers play an integral
part in the mortgage process, particularly by maintaining the
distribution of payments from homeowners to investors.27 When
homeowners fall behind on payments, servicers are tasked with
handling the situation in favor of investors, implementing loss
mitigation procedures such as a foreclosure action.28
For non-GSEs, HAMP promoted, through incentives, a
Servicer Provider Agreement (SPA) to be implemented by
servicers.29 These agreements are contracts which necessitate
compliance with HAMP guidelines in order to receive certain
benefits in return.30 HAMP’s objective was to assist three to four
million defaulting homeowners.31 By modifying their monthly
payments, the goal was to allow more homeowners to remain in
their homes rather than face foreclosure.32 HAMP alone
committed $75 billion in incentives to loan investors, servicers,
and homeowners in an effort to meet the program’s goals.33
Securitization of mortgages held by non-GSEs lends to the
difficulty of modifying loans that are no longer held by the
servicer but rather held by investors.34 This difficulty explains
the difference in the loan modification review guarantee by
GSEs and the lack of guarantee by non-GSEs.
In the first year of its operations through March 2010,
HAMP produced 230,801 permanent modifications.35 Yet at the
24 Id. at 124.
25 Id. at 124–25.
26 Id.
27 Robinson, supra note 21; see also Suzanne Kapner, The Role of Mortgage
Servicers, FIN. TIMES (June 15, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/59a6f4fc-78af-11df-
a312-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/A7WZ-GSZU].
28 See Robinson, supra note 21.
29 SeeMarcantel, supra note 7, at 125.
30 Id.
31 W. Justin Jacobs, Note, Help Or Hamp(er)?—The Courts’ Reluctance to
Provide the Right to a Private Action Under HAMP and Its Detrimental Effect on
Homeowners, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 274 (2012).
32 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-837, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM: TREASURY ACTIONSNEEDED TOMAKE THEHOME AFFORDABLEMODIFICATION
PROGRAMMORE TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE 11 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
300/292806.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML9R-HBW8].
33 Id. at 9.
34 Robinson, supra note 21.
35 Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from
the Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ.
L. REV. 727, 729 (2010).
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same time, the program experienced significant issues.36 In June
2012, HAMP was significantly revised to both expand its scope
and address issues that arose in its early years.37 Throughout
the lifetime of the program, many changes, such as streamline
modifications, were made through supplemental directives
issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.38
It is important to recognize that HAMP was an
administrative program created pursuant to the EESA and not
a codified statute.39 The lack of codification hindered
participation in HAMP by allowing for involvement to be
voluntary and for the guidelines to act simply as
recommendations.40 Furthermore, “[HAMP did] not provide any
express right of action in favor of borrowers (including the only
provision of the Act that expressly deals with judicial review),
and no language in the Act indicate[d] a congressional intent to
create such a right.”41 Through the development of several key
court cases, borrowers began experiencing a stronger HAMP,
but a HAMP that still fell short of its goals.42
II. EARLY PROGRAMS, THE BEGINNING OFHAMP, AND THE
LITIGATION THAT FOLLOWED
An evaluation of prior initiatives illustrates the few
lessons HAMP learned from the initiatives’ failures. First
announced in December 2007 by Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson, an early plan was the Streamlined Foreclosure and
Loss Avoidance Framework program.43 The program, which
36 See Dayen, supra note 9; see also Snyder, supra note 1 (listing twenty-seven
statistics that illustrate the seriousness of the housing crisis and the nationwide
mortgage problems HAMP faced).
37 See generallyMAKINGHOMEAFFORDABLE, HOMEAFFORDABLEMODIFICATION
PROGRAM: BASENET PRESENT VALUE (NPV)MODEL V5.0 MODELDOCUMENTATION (2012),
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/npvmodeldocumentationv50.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TF9T-ZNN8] (detailing revisions to HAMP).
38 See, e.g., MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE 15-06:
MAKINGHOMEAFFORDABLEPROGRAM—STREAMLINEDMODIFICATION PROCESS 1 (2015),
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/sd1506.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/TT7N-56K5] [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE] (providing guidance to
servicers on how to properly implement the streamlined modification process for non-
GSE Mortgages).
39 Thomas M. Schehr & Matthew Mitchell, The Home Affordable Modification
Program and a New Wave of Consumer Finance Litigation, Mich. B.J., 38−39, June 2012,
https://www.michbar.org/file/journal/pdf/pdf4article2042.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z56X-H2KV].
40 Id. at 39; see also Andrew Jakabovics, Called to the Carpet, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 28, 2009, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
economy/news/2009/07/28/6461/called-to-the-carpet/ [https://perma.cc/9KAY-93YT].
41 Schehr & Mitchell, supra note 39, at 39.
42 See infra Section II.B.
43 Robinson, supra note 21; see also AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM,
STREAMLINED FORECLOSURE AND LOSS AVOIDANCE FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITIZED
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“applie[d] to all first lien subprime residential adjustable rate
mortgage [ ] loans,” was established in order to minimize the
number of delinquencies and foreclosures among homeowners
possessing securitized mortgages.44 Under this plan, the
“mortgage servicers would be encouraged to initiate
communication with subprime borrowers and to voluntarily
modify their mortgages. Specifically, servicers were encouraged
to modify mortgages by freezing the homeowner’s introductory
interest rate for five years.”45 In addition to restrictions on
eligibility for the plan, major obstacles stood in the way of the
participating servicers.46 But this plan was not equipped to
handle the growing mortgage crisis, thus overshadowing any
positive impact of the program.47
Shortly after the announcement of the Streamlined
Foreclosure and Loss Avoidance Framework program, the
George W. Bush Administration introduced the FHASecure
program in August 2007.48 Being the first major refinance
program implemented by the administration, it targeted
homeowners of subprime adjustable-rate loans who experienced
substantial increases in their monthly mortgage payments.49
The program was unsuccessful, suffering not only because of its
voluntary participation, but also because it forced servicers to
take write-downs, causing them to reject the program entirely.50
By the end of 2008, the program had only assisted 4,200
homeowners, resulting in the program’s termination.51
Following the failures of the Streamlined Foreclosure
and Loss Avoidance Framework program and the FHASecure
program, “the Bush Administration announced the creation of
the Hope for Homeowners Program on October 1, 2008.”52 This
program was created to address the failures of previous
initiatives, allowing homeowners to work with the Federal
SUBPRIME ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE LOANS (2007), http://portal.delaware.gov/
foreclosureinfo/docs/FinalASFStatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/46NP-EJVJ].
44 See id. at 1, 6.
45 Robinson, supra note 21.
46 See id.
47 Eliana Balla, Robert E. Carpenter & Breck Robinson, The Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, Assessing the Effectiveness of the Paulson “Teaser Freezer” Plan:
Evidence From the ABX Index, 1, 33 (2010), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/
?item_id=477199&filepath=/files/docs/historical/frbrich/wp/frbrich_wp10-6.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P76R-U3B9].
48 Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial




52 See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23 (2012); see also Robinson, supra note 21.
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Housing Administration in refinancing their mortgages.53
Similar to the previous program “servicers had to first write
down the principal, this time to no more than 96.5% . . . of [the]
appraised value.”54 In addition to writing down the principal,
servicers paid a mandatory premium and forfeited certain
additional fees from the mortgagors.55 But these terms were
viewed as being “no more attractive to servicers than going to
foreclosure.”56 The failure to create an enticing program for
servicers resulted in the program failing, leaving homeowners
with little to no help.57 By May 2009, the program had assisted
only one homeowner in refinancing into a Hope for Homeowners
Program loan.58
Enacted shortly before HAMP was the Streamlined
Modification Program.59 This program “use[d] an affordability
measure to modify mortgages held by government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs). To quickly modify mortgages at risk of
default, the program modifie[d] first liens to reduce the
homeowner’s front-end DTI [(debt-to-income)] ratio to 38
percent.”60 If the DTI was still in excess of 38 percent, the
program enabled servicers to reduce the interest rate on the
mortgage in increments of 0.125 percent.61 Servicers had one
alternative: postponingmortgagors’ payments on a portion of the
principal, resulting in an inevitable “extra” balloon payment for
the mortgagor.62 Typically, balloon payments are significantly
greater than a homeowner’s previous mortgage payments,
sometimes reaching “as high as hundreds of thousands of
dollars.”63 Many homeowners, particularly ones facing
foreclosure, cannot afford such a large principal payment.64 In
fact, due to the financial constraints, rather than fulfilling all of
these payments, mortgagors typically sell their homes.65 Balloon
payments are not ideal during a period where home values are
53 See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23 (2012); see also Robinson, supra note 21.
54 McCoy, supra note 48, at 731–32.




59 Fannie Mae, Announcement 08-33, Introduction of the Streamlined
Modification Program1 (Dec. 12, 2008), https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/
pdf/2008/0833.pdf [https://perma.cc/USM4-RCSX].
60 Robinson, supra note 21.
61 See id.
62 Id.
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decreasing,66 therefore incorporating such payments into a
solution can be problematic.
The government had good reason to create programs with
tough terms due to the declining housing market. “[R]efinacing
underwater loans at the full appraised value would have
eventually saddled the government with unwanted losses while
rewarding lenders and investors for making inflated loans.”67 This
potential burden explains the resistance illustrated by servicers
and investors to swallow the losses themselves through compliance
with the loan modification programs initiated prior to HAMP.68
Unlike previous programs, “HAMP require[d] all banks
and lending institutions accepting funding from the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP)” to implement loan modifications
for loans that were eligible under the HAMP guidelines.69 As
with previous programs, institutions not receiving such funding
had full discretion whether to fulfill qualifying loan
modifications.70 The more attractive financial incentives to
servicers and investors allowed HAMP to reach more
homeowners⎯modifying a greater number of home loans than
any program enacted before it, unfortunately, an unimpressive
feat considering the dismal failures of earlier programs.71
A. The Claims That Failed and Those That Strengthened
Homeowners’ Rights
The explosion of litigation since the initiation of HAMP
has resulted in differing opinions among the courts on how to
approach various claims brought by homeowners regarding
HAMP.72 Plaintiffs have brought suits stemming from theories
of direct liability, contract, tort, equal credit opportunity, and
even constitutional theories, the suits resulting in mixed
opinions by the courts.73
In some of the earliest lawsuits regarding HAMP,
homeowners argued servicers could be held directly liable for
violating the terms of supplemental directives issued by the
66 Id.
67 McCoy, supra note 48, at 732.
68 See id.
69 See Robinson, supra note 21.
70 Id.
71 See Arias v. Elite Mortg. Grp., Inc., 108 A.3d 21, 26 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2015) (citing Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012));
see also COHEN, COHEN&THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 3; McCoy, supra note 48, at 739.
72 See generally Schehr & Mitchell, supra note 39 (discussing the various legal
theories homeowners brought against banks and servicers).
73 See id. at 39−41.
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Treasury.74 As discussed in Part I, however, “HAMP [was] not a
federal statute or regulation, and the program [was] not codified
in any public law.”75 Under HAMP, it is generally recognized
that there exists no private right of action, therefore suits have
been unsuccessful under the direct liability theory.76
Some HAMP plaintiffs have chosen to assert tort-based
claims of negligence or fraud.77 The majority of courts have
rejected borrowers’ attempts to pursue these tort-based claims,
citing a failure to establish a duty of care between the borrower
and servicer.78 In Parks v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, the
plaintiff claimed the mortgage servicer committed “negligence
per se” by not satisfying the HAMP requirements.79But the court
dismissed the negligence claim, finding it was “nothing more
than the rebuffed theory that HAMP creates a cause of action,”
and reaffirming the notion that HAMP does not create a private
cause of action in favor of borrowers.80
Furthermore, some plaintiffs have claimed that mortgage
servicers violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act81 by
discriminating against them, favoring some applications over
others, and in doing so, failing to offer a loan modification
following a TPP agreement.82 In Willis v. Countrywide Home
Loan Servicing, LP, plaintiff Winfield Willis, representing
himself, alleged that his loan modification application was not
considered to the same degree as nonminority applications.83
The court cited Willis’ failure to support his claims of racial
74 See id. at 39.
75 Schehr & Mitchell, supra note 39, at 39.
76 Valtierra v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-0849 AWI GSA, 2011 WL
590596, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (“[T]here is no private cause of action under
HAMP.”); Hart v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. Mich.
2010) (“There is no express or implied right to sue fund recipients . . . under TARP or
HAMP.”) (quoting Aleem v. Bank of Am., No. EDCV 09-01812-VSP (RZx), 2010 WL
532330 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010)); See also Raduege, supra note 12, at *2.
77 See Parks v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 825 F. Supp. 2d 713, 716 (E.D.
Va. 2011); Stolba v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 10-cv-6014 (WJM) (MF), 2011 WL 3444078,
at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011).
78 See Miller v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Tex. 2013)
(dismissing borrower’s negligence claim based on servicer’s misrepresentations,
concluding that the servicer owed no duty to the borrower); see also Parks, 825 F. Supp.
2d at 716; Stolba, 2011 WL 3444078 at *1; Clay v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 392
S.W.3d 72, 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
79 Parks, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
80 Id.
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
82 See Adams v. U.S. Bank, No. 10-10567, 2010 WL 2670702, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
July 1, 2010) (dismissing Plaintiff ’ s ECOA claim for failure to support her claim); see
also Willis v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. CCB-09-1455, 2009 WL
5206475 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2009).
83 Willis, 2009 WL 5206475, at *1, *7.
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discrimination, finding them to be “too conclusory and
speculative” and awarded summary judgment to the servicer.84
Additionally, some plaintiffs attempted to raise
constitutional challenges in response to servicers failing to issue
loan modifications. In Williams v. Geithner, plaintiffs alleged “a
violation of their constitutional right to procedural due
process . . . [claiming] the history and requirements of the
HAMP demonstrate that Congress intended to provide a
particular benefit to homeowners facing foreclosure, and,
therefore, Defendants are required to provide that benefit in
accordance with Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”85 The court
ruled against the plaintiffs though, finding that HAMP “did not
intend to create a property interest in loan modification[ ] ” plans
for defaulting homeowners.86
Constitutional issues have not only been raised but have
played integral parts in litigation. The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that HAMP did not impliedly preempt a Minnesota
statute, or violate other constitutional provisions in its decision
inGretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc.87 The court reasoned that the
lack of a federal cause of action to force HAMP directives did not
prohibit a state from providing a private cause of action.88
Constitutional claims continued to be raised throughout the
operation of HAMP, most of which were either dismissed by the
courts or amended under other causes of action.89
Numerous claims, stemming from HAMP, failed over the
duration of the program; however, the prolific number of
lawsuits gave HAMP plaintiffs insight as to which claims might
survive the pleading stage.90 HAMP, lacking codification, stands
starkly juxtaposed with other federal statutes and regulations
which clearly provide liability for failure to comply.91 Although
84 Id. at *24.
85 Williams v. Geithner, No. 09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380, at *13−14
(D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2009).
86 Id. at *17; see also Huxtable v. Geithner, No. 09cv1846 BTM (WVG), 2010
WL 11570882, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) (“Congress did not intend to create an
entitlement or protected property interest in HAMP modifications.”).
87 Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc., 846 N.W.2d 424, 434–35 (Minn. 2014).
88 Id.
89 See Neal v. E-Trade Bank, No. S-11-0954 FCD/GGH, 2011 WL 3813158 , at
*3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due process claims
relating to the HAMP for failure to allege sufficient state action); Ozogu v. CitiMortgage,
Inc., No. CV 10-9687 CAS (AGRx), 2011 WL 2940391, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2011)
(holding that the “[borrowers] do not have a protected property interest in a loan
modification under HAMP”).
90 See supra notes 73−89 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2012) (“Any person
who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with
respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer . . . .”).
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HAMP remained an incentive-based program throughout its
duration, some litigation helped create a foundation for
homeowners to stand on, one which it lacked upon initiation.92
Some of the lawsuits brought against lenders and
servicers under HAMP were successful. Two theories, brought
by borrowers approved for TPPs, were based on third-party-
beneficiary and breach of contract.93 “Plaintiffs often claim that
they are third-party intended beneficiaries of the [Servicer
Participation Agreement (SPA)] and, therefore, have standing to
sue for a purported violation of the SPA.”94 The SPA, a form
contract issued by the government and distributed to servicers
as a template, specifies thirty-six pages worth of information
regarding the agreement between the two parties.95 A few years
after HAMP was enacted, borrowers began to experience some
success claiming liability through a breach of contract claim,
arguing that a mortgage servicer that fails to offer a permanent
loan modification following the successful completion of the TPP
should be held liable.96
B. Specific Cases That Strengthened Homeowners’ Rights
Within HAMP
Since the inception of HAMP, courts nationwide have
seen an outpouring of lawsuits by borrowers based on loan
servicers’ decisions to decline loan modifications under HAMP.97
Unsure of how to address the groundswell of lawsuits and various
claims, courts in the early years of HAMP often dismissed claims.98
As litigation continued over the years, some district courts began
giving new meaning to allegations brought against servicers and
investors involving HAMP.99 Eventually, court decisions gave new
life to HAMP and hope for borrowers, beginningwith the landmark
decision inWigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.100
92 See Schehr & Mitchell, supra note 39, at 38.
93 SeeWigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012); Miller v.
Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2012).
94 Schehr & Mitchell, supra note 39, at 40.
95 Id. at 39; see also COMMITMENT TO PURCHASE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT AND
SERVICER PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/
docs/hamp_servicer/servicerparticipationagreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8325-4YK8].
96 See Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 236 (1st Cir. 2013);
Wigod, 673 F.3d at 566; Arias v. Elite Mortg. Grp., Inc., 108 A.3d 21, 24 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2015); Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P., 110 A.3d 137, 143
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
97 See supra Section II.A.
98 See supra Section II.A.
99 See supra notes 93−96 and accompanying text.
100 Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012).
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1. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
In 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ruled that a homeowner within HAMP could
maintain a private cause of action against lenders or servicers
under specified circumstances.101 The court in Wigod held that
borrowers that entered into a TPP under HAMP are in direct
privity with their servicer and can bring a claim for relief when
the servicer fails to fulfill the terms of the TPP.102 The
homeowner in Wigod submitted financials to the servicer and
requested a HAMP modification.103 The homeowner was offered
a HAMP modification and received a TPP based on her
financials.104 In the agreement signed by both parties prior to the
TPP taking effect, the plan clearly stated that the servicer would
offer her a permanent modification after all payments were
made and if all representations made during the modification
process remained current and accurate.105 But following the
TPP, the homeowner was not offered a permanent modification
and she filed suit.106 After evaluating both arguments, the court
stated “[h]ere a reasonable person in Wigod’s position would
read the TPP as a definite offer to provide a permanent
modification that she could accept so long as she satisfied the
conditions.”107 The court ruled in Wigod’s favor, reversing the
district court ruling, inter alia, on the contract claim.108
The decision in Wigod was a huge victory for borrowers,
giving plaintiffs reaching the TPP stage of a modification some
ground to stand upon while also lending courts a potentially new
avenue in which to rule.109 Prior to the Wigod decision, courts
agreed that HAMP did not give borrowers a private cause of
action against the lender or servicer if after the duration of a
TPP they did not approve a loan modification.110 As the court in
Brown v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon stated, “[a]ll of the district courts
that have considered the [breach of contract] issue have held
101 See id. at 576.
102 Id. at 562 (“In more abstract terms, then, when Wells Fargo executed the
TPP, its terms included a unilateral offer to modify Wigod’s loan conditioned on her
compliance with the stated terms of the bargain.”).
103 Id. at 558.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 558, 560.
106 Id. at 558–90.
107 Id. at 562.
108 Id. at 586.
109 See infra notes 126−132 and accompanying text.
110 Brown v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 1:10-CV-550, 2011 WL 206124, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 21, 2011); Cohn v. Bank of Am., No. 2:10-cv-00865, 2011 WL 98840, at
*6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011).
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that homeowners do not have a private right of action under
HAMP for denial of a loan modification.”111 Post Wigod, courts
began “reviewing trial period plans,” between borrower and
servicers, more closely.112
Interpretations of the Wigod holding have varied.113 In
some instances, where the TPP was not signed by the servicer,
courts refused to rule in favor of the borrower.114 Alternatively,
the Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. court found “the
reasoning of Wigod . . . to be persuasive,” concluding there to be
a sufficient allegation of mutual assent when the TPP agreement
was not signed by the servicer.115 While others, although
agreeing with the holding in Wigod, have dug deeper into the
facts by distinguishing the language within the respective
TPPs.116 Although some rulings that followed still varied,Wigod
gave much needed strength to homeowners seeking qualification
under HAMP, especially for borrowers that were able to reach
the TPP stage of a loan modification.
Under HAMP, a homeowner that met the qualifications for
a loan modification was first placed on a TPP for a short duration,
often no longer than three months.117 As a New Jersey appellate
court noted in a later opinion, citing the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in
Wigod, “[e]ven though there is no private cause of action under
HAMP, a mortgagor may nonetheless assert a common-law
contract claim based on a bank’s failure to honor promises made in
a HAMP [TPP] Agreement.”118 This holding solidifies the notion
that if all payments during the TPP are made on time and the rest
111 Brown, 2011 WL 206124, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 21, 2011); see, e.g., Cohn,
2011 WL 98840, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011) (finding no private right of action under
HAMP); Wilson v. GMAC Mortgage LLC, 10CV2559 DMS (NLS), 2010 WL 5387829, at
*1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010) (“HAMP generally involves an agreement between a
participating loan servicer and the U.S. Department of Treasury and a borrower does
not have a private right to enforce the HAMP contract.”).
112 See What’s Good Following Wigod?, WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS CO.,
LPA (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.weltman.com/?t=40&an=40059&format=xml&p=8082
[https://perma.cc/6U3P-6EZ3].
113 See Cave v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 12-5366, 2013 WL 1915660, at *6
(E.D. Pa. May 9, 2013); see also Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 283 F.R.D. 533, 551–
52 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
114 See Rummel v. Vantium Captial, Inc., No. 12-10952, 2012 WL 2564846, at
*7 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2012); Brady v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 1:11-CV-838, 2012 WL
1900906, at *7 (W.D. Mich. May 24, 2012); Soin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 2:12-634 WBS
EFB, 2012 WL 1232324, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012).
115 Sutcliffe, 283 F.R.D. at 545, 551–52.
116 Cave v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 11-4586, 2012 WL 1957588, at *4–5
(E.D. Pa. May 30, 2012).
117 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Home Affordable Modification ProgramGuidelines 9
(2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/modification_pro
gram_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MP6-JZUV].
118 Arias v. Elite Mortg. Grp., Inc., 108 A.3d 21, 22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
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of the TPP requirements are fulfilled, the homeowner will possess
rights to a permanent modification agreement.119
2. Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
The trend continued and a year after the landmark
decision in Wigod, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that a servicer may be held liable for failing to
convert a trial loan modification to a permanent modification in
a timely manner.120 In Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, the lender
refused to provide a permanent modification agreement by the
modification effective date after the borrower fulfilled the
TPP.121 The “[borrower] asserted several claims, including
breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and
violation of [the State Unfair Debt Collection Practices Act]”
(UDCPA) under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A.122
“The District Court dismissed Young’s claims, and she appealed
to the First Circuit.”123 Reversing the dismissal, the First Circuit
noted that the fulfillment of a borrower’s obligations under the
TPP would require Wells Fargo to offer a permanent modification
under the terms agreed upon in the TPP.124
Following the Wigod and Young holdings, courts have
been more inclined to declare a breach of contract “when a
borrower fully complies with a trial period plan and the servicer
fails to timely offer a permanent modification consistent with
servicing guidelines.”125 A flood of victories was not necessarily
evident following both Young and Wigod. Rather, the cases
demonstrate a “common thread . . . that situation-specific facts
are critical” to the borrower’s case, preventing the floodgates of
class actions from opening.126
119 See id. at 22–23.
120 See Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 233–36 (1st Cir. 2013);
Young v. Wells Fargo: First Circuit Holds That Failure to Timely Convert Trial
Modification Gives Rise to Breach of Contract Claim, HOUSE KEEPING REPORT (May 28,
2013), http://www.housekeepingreport.com/young-v-wells-fargo-first-circuit-holds-that-
failure-to-timely-convert-trial-modification-gives-rise-to-breach-of-contract-claim/ [https://
perma.cc/PHA4-E8NT] [hereinafter Housekeeping Report].
121 Young, 717 F.3d at 234, 230; see also Housekeeping Report, supra note 120.
122 Young, 717 F.3d at 234, 228; see also Housekeeping Report, supra note 120.
123 Id.
124 See Young, 717 F.3d at 234, 242.
125 See Housekeeping Report, supra note 120.
126 Neil Jonas & Cory Howard, Essay, Avoiding Liability for Mortgage Lenders
and Servicers Under HAMP and State Consumer Protection Laws During the Mortgage
Modification Process, 1 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. ONLINE 83 (Nov. 15, 2013), http://
suffolklawreview.org/jonas-hamp/ [https://perma.cc/MNF8-A58P] (“[T]he same situationally
specific facts, which are necessary components of a well-pleaded complaint seeking lender
liability, also cut against the possibility of creating a class of similarly situated plaintiffs
harmed by the loan-modification process.”).
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3. Arias v. Elite Mortg. Grp., Inc.
In Arias v. Elite Mortgage Group, Inc., the first reported
New Jersey case on this issue, “[t]he [trial court found] that the
TPP . . . was not a binding contract to modify the [borrower’s]
loan.”127 The issue before the court was whether the lender would
be bound by a written TPP which allowed the borrower to make
three reduced monthly mortgage payments as a requirement of
the TPP.128 The court examined whether the TPP constituted a
unilateral offer by the lender contingent on the borrower
complying with the requirements within the TPP.129 Further the
court stated that “case law suggests that an agreement that
purports to bind a debtor to make payments while leaving the
mortgage company free to give her nothing in return might
violate the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.”130 The court cited
Wigod to support its holding that “even though there is no
private cause of action under HAMP, a mortgagor may
nonetheless assert a common-law contract claim based on a
bank’s failure to honor promises made in a HAMP Trial Period
Plan Agreement.”131 The court noted that Wigod rejected any
argument that a TPP lacked consideration, as a borrower’s
obligation to submit additional financial information and submit
to counseling would be sufficient.132 Regrettably, the borrowers
in Arias failed to make the required payments under the TPP,
leading to the appellate court’s decision to affirm the trial court’s
ruling in favor of the lender.133 Arias set precedent in New Jersey
holding that HAMP does not prohibit a borrower from asserting
a breach of contract claim under state law. This decision came
at a time where courts throughout the country went both ways
on the issue.134
4. Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P.
Shortly after Arias, the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division was again asked to address whether a
127 SeeArias v.EliteMortg.Grp., Inc., 108A.3d21, 22 (N.J. Super.Ct.App.Div. 2015).
128 See id. at 22–24.
129 Id. at 23–24.
130 Id. at 23.
131 Id. at 22.
132 Id. at 23.
133 See id. at 25–26.
134 Michael Anselmo & John Blatt, It has Been One Year Since the 7th Circuit
Issued Its Opinion on Wigod, National (Aug. 1, 2013), http://alolawgroup.com/content/
learningpdfs/387-learning_pdf-wigod.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ45-NLKQ] (“[r]ulings from
courts around the country run the gamut”); see also Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan
Servicing, L.P., 110 A.3d 137, 142–43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015); Arias, 108 A.3d at 23.
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borrower under HAMP could sustain claims against a servicer
for denying to modify his or her mortgage following the TPP.135
The Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P. court did
not stray from Arias, stating that “borrowers should not be
denied the opportunity to assert claims alleging a lender failed
to comply with its stated obligations under the TPP.”136 The court
further held that as long as all terms of the TPP are fulfilled by
the borrower, then “the specific terms of the TPP govern the
parties’ agreement.”137 It is important to note, however, that the
court did not suggest that the “temporary payment under any
TPP will necessarily become the adjusted rate in a modification
agreement” and, therefore, the adjusted rate calculated by the
lender may differ from the TPP payment.138 Following the
rulings in Arias and Miller, a party may bring a common-law
breach of contract action based on a lender denying modification,
thus taking away much of the lender’s discretion after a
borrower fulfills the required terms of the TPP.
HAMP litigation has continued even after the program’s
expiration.139 As the Treasury continues to roll out new
initiatives, homeowners will likely continue to allege legal
wrongdoing against mortgage investors and servicers.140 HAMP
litigation has helped clarify the duties of servicers and investors
and established some guidance for plaintiffs looking to hold
servicers accountable.141 The resulting HAMP precedent
benefitted servicers who developed “a road map of how to defend
against these claims.”142 Despite these defensive roadmaps,
litigating remains a useful tool to homeowners trying to keep
their homes.143 Courts have illustrated a greater inclination to
enforce HAMP when borrowers claim non-compliance.144 Due in
part to the more favorable precedent supporting borrower claims
and potentially because “judges who routinely decide foreclosure
cases” have gained a greater understanding of HAMP making
135 See Miller, 110 A.3d at 141.
136 Id. at 143.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 143 n.7.
139 See Appellant’s Brief on Appeal, Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Bronson, No.
2017AP2301, 2018 WL 1109989 (Wis. App. IV Dist.).
140 SeeMarcantel, supra note 7, at 126–27.
141 See supra Section II.A.
142 Michael F. Hord Jr. & Joshua A. Huber, Loss Mitigation, HAMP and
Lawsuits: A Recipe for Litigation, HG.ORG, http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=21651
[https://perma.cc/WRC7-QXPV].
143 Rebekah Cook-Mack & Sarah Parady, Home Affordable Modification
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them better equipped to handle the issues surrounding HAMP
related cases.145
III. HOWHAMPHAS FAILED
HAMP “seems to have created more litigation than it has
happy homeowners.”146 The program failed to meet its objective
of helping homeowners facing foreclosure and instead has
largely benefitted financial institutions, leaving most of the
problems it set out to fix, or at least significantly improve, still
looming over the housing market.147 The government’s use of
HAMP to simply encourage mortgage companies to assist
borrowers rather than mandate assistance is largely to blame.148
When the program was first announced by President Obama on
February 18, 2009, “he promised it would assist [three] to [four]
million homeowners to modify their loans [in order] to avoid
foreclosure.”149 As of December 2015, “less than [one] million
borrowers have received ongoing assistance [with] nearly one in
three re-default[ing] after receiving inadequate modifications.”150
“[Six] million families lost their homes [in foreclosure] over the
same time period.”151
HAMP’s failure is primarily a result of its poor strategy
and design.152 Rather than stimulating the housing market by
distributing resources directly to the borrowers, it gave the
funds to mortgage servicing companies with simple guidelines,
leaving mortgage companies to ultimately decide when, how,
and why they should issue assistance to borrowers.153 Leaving
such discretion in the hands of for-profit mortgage companies
built a foundation that was ready to crack from the start.
145 See id.
146 Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 728 F.3d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 2013).
147 See David Dayen, Obama Program That Hurt Homeowners and Helped Big
Banks is Ending, INTERCEPT (Dec. 28, 2015, 12:07 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/12/28/
obama-program-hurt-homeowners-and-helped-big-banks-now-its-dead/ [https://perma.cc/
73L8-AWKU].
148 See Casey B. Mulligan, The Failure of Mortgage Modification, N.Y. TIMES:
ECONOMIX (Nov. 3, 2010, 6:00 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/the-
failure-of-mortgage-modification/ [https://perma.cc/4UR7-EBT7].
149 Dayen, supra note 147; OFF. OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 132, 140 (July 29,
2015), https://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/July_29_2015_Report_to_Congress.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BA2P-EAKA] [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTORGEN.].
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HAMP simply encouraged banks and servicers to conduct
loan modifications for struggling homeowners.154 There exists a
large difference between urging banks and servicers to take certain
actions and forcing them to implement change. Even after a
homeowner fulfilled all payments of a TPP, “provid[ed] the
necessary supporting documentation, and maintain[ed]
eligibility, . . . the servicer should offer the borrower a permanent
loan modification” but did not necessarily have to.155 The Wigod
holding helped alleviate some of this burden upon the borrower,
but not all courts followed suit.156 In addition, court decisions were
based on specific facts, preventing borrowers from bringing a class
action lawsuit whichwould have significantly reduced the financial
burden on plaintiffs seeking justice.157
“Although HAMP never covered the entire mortgage
marketplace, HAMP’s failure to reach its intended scale has one
root cause: massive servicer noncompliance.”158 The program
never reached the promised number of homeowners and instead
fell far short of this goal, having only lowered mortgage
payments for about 1.6 million borrowers as of the end of 2016.159
Even after the government extended HAMP application
deadlines on multiple occasions, the results were still
lackluster.160 According to the Office of the Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, “extending
HAMP’s timeframe without eliminating the barriers
homeowners face will not increase HAMP’s effectiveness.”161 The
government has spent billions of taxpayer dollars on an
ineffective program, yet of the $29.8 billion used to fund HAMP,
$18.5 billion remained unspent as of June 30, 2015.162
154 Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 2013).
155 See id. at 229; Dayen, supra note 9 (Chris Cooley, a California homeowner,
renegotiated his loan through HAMP. After reducing his mortgage to an affordable rate,
Wells Fargo “rejected [Cooley] for a permanent modification . . . [but] never informed
him [of the denial.]” “What followed was what most homeowners would consider a
nightmare. While Cooley tried to stave off foreclosure to save his home and livelihood,
Wells Fargo paid the other renters living in the property $5,000 to move out behind his
back, and then denied Cooley further aid—because his income, which he drew from the
rentals, was too low. ‘They took my income away from me, and then they couldn’t give
me a loan because I had no income,’ Cooley said. ‘What a wonderful catch-22.’ . . . Tired
of fighting, Cooley ended up leaving his home, and became just one of the seven million
foreclosure victims in the US since the bursting of the housing bubble in 2007.”).
156 See Anselmo & Blatt, supra note 134.
157 See id.; see also Jonas & Howard, supra note 126.
158 COHEN, COHEN& THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 4.
159 SeeOFFICEOFTHESPECIAL INSPECTORGEN., supra note 149, at 56, 100;Merle,
supra note 16 (“About a third of [the 1.6 million borrowers] eventually fell behind on their
payments again.”).
160 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTORGEN., supra note 149, at 56.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 99.
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HAMP left many homeowners in foreclosure rather than
fulfilling its goal of relieving the majority of them from
inevitable foreclosure.163 “Servicers have denied an alarmingly
high number of applications for the Home Affordable Mortgage
Program, with only 30 [percent] of homeowners who applied for
HAMP getting in.”164 As of April 2015, JPMorgan Chase Bank,
Citibank, and Bank of America had all turned down at least 80
percent of HAMP applications, leaving a majority of HAMP
applicants with no economic alternatives.165 It is important to
note, however, that denials for reasons in control of the
homeowner are included in this percentage.166 Even if
homeowners received modifications through HAMP, the
modifications often did not alleviate many of the financial
hardships experienced by homeowners.167 On average, “HAMP
modifications reduced monthly mortgage payments to [31
percent] of gross monthly income.”168 The modifications “left
borrowers with high overall debt-to-income ratios, did not require
reduction of loan principal even for those owing much more than
the value of their homes, and used primarily temporary interest
rate breaks, resulting in a high risk of redefault.”169
Of significant issue during the existence of HAMP were
widespread inconsistencies in the modification process.170 Many
homeowners entered into TPPs and did not receive permanent
HAMP modifications following the completion of the trials.171
Homeowners, fulfilling the obligations of their TPPs, have sued
in response to being denied for permanent modification,
typically asserting breach of contract claims.172 In response to
these claims:
163 SeeMarcantel, supra note 7, at 126–27.
164 Brena Swanson, SIGTARP Report Reveals Massive Failure of HAMP,
HOUSINGWIRE (July 29, 2015), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/34609-sigtarp-
report-reveals-massive-failure-of-hamp [https://perma.cc/A6XK-KEPG].
165 Id.
166 See Colin Robertson, Four Million Homeowners Denied HAMP Loan
Modifications, More Changes Coming?, THE TRUTH ABOUT MORTGAGE (July 30, 2015),
http://www.thetruthaboutmortgage.com/four-million-homeowners-denied-hamp-loan-
modifications-more-changes-coming/ [https://perma.cc/YH74-J27Z] (Some reasons behind
denials are (1) the homeowner’s application was “incomplete” (2) the homeowner withdrew
the HAMP application or “failed to accept” an offered HAMP trial, (3) the homeowner’s
income fell outside of HAMP eligibility.).
167 See Dayen, supra note 9 (“Around 28% of all modified loans have slipped
back into default, including nearly half of those loans modified back in 2009 at the height
of the foreclosure crisis.”).
168 Braucher, supra note 35, at 729.
169 Id.
170 See Raduege, supra note 12 at *2.
171 See id.
172 Id.
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courts have [often] disallowed [them] holding, for example, that TPP
agreements do not promise permanent modifications, their terms are
not sufficiently definite, the homeowners do not give adequate
consideration, the TPP is not effective without the servicer’s
signature, there was a failure of a condition, that enforcement is
barred by the statute of frauds, or that specific factual circumstances
warranted a finding that a contract either did not exist or that it was
not breached.173
The numerous homeowners that failed to qualify for
HAMP are left with poor alternatives that put extreme strain on
the homeowners’ livelihoods. One option is for the homeowner to
short sell their home.174 A second is for the homeowner to “giv[e]
the home back to the lender via a ‘deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.’”175
A more ideal alternative, but one that is potentially difficult for
homeowners to achieve, is receiving a forbearance, which results
in the lender reducing or suspending the homeowner’s loan
payments.176 This suspension typically lasts for up to ninety
days, allowing the homeowner more time to gather the required
payment amounts.177 Alternatively, some homeowners may
attempt to find suitable tenants who will rent their homes,
allowing them to pay down the mortgage through rental income.178
Lastly, homeowners sometimes turned to bankruptcy courts for
help.179 These courts have played a significant role in helping
homeowners when HAMP failed to improve their situation.180
HAMP proved to be a poor alternative to homeowners
facing foreclosure, often resulting in simply delaying the
imminent foreclosure process.181 HAMP’s overall poor strategy
and design resulted in high rates of denial for borrowers seeking
modification.182 Many borrowers turned to the courts and
expensive litigation for assistance.183 While Congress watched
from afar, some courts gave life to borrowers’ claims, but the
173 Id.
174 HAMP: Home Loan Modification Program Information, supra note 9 (A short
sale is when the borrower “[and] bank negotiate a deal [which] allow[s the homeowner] to sell





179 See Coco, supra note 2, at 435–44.
180 See id.
181 See generally Peter Miller,Did the HAMPMod Program Delay the Foreclosure
Crisis?, REALTYTRAC (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.realtytrac.com/news/did-the-hamp-
mod-program-delay-the-foreclosure-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/7UFF-8V88] (“HAMP was not
designed to help distressed borrowers, but was implemented to ‘foam the runway’ for
Wall Street banks by ‘stretching out foreclosures, giving the banks more time to absorb
losses while the other parts of the bailouts juiced bank profits.’”).
182 See Swanson, supra note 164; see also Dayen, supra note 147.
183 See supra Part II.
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inconsistency in these decisions proved detrimental to the very
borrowers that HAMP was intended to help.184
IV. LIFE AFTERHAMP
“On Dec[ember] 31, 2016, the government’s Home
Affordable Modification Program . . . [came to an] end” with no
expectation of an extension.185 The program’s expiration may
result in significant consumer harm if the government fails to
strategically implement loss mitigation programs that
encompass solutions to the exact problems that arose during the
housing crisis.186 The Treasury, Department of Housing and
Urban Development, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency
stated prior to the program’s end that, “while these programs are
set to end this year, the government plans to continue working
with the mortgage industry on various loss-mitigation programs
moving forward, but caution that the industry needs to be
prepared to do more moving forward.”187 For the purposes of
preventing future foreclosure crises, the agencies cited the
importance of several principles that they believe should establish
the foundation for future programs in the loss mitigation sector.188
These “guiding principles” include: “accessibility, affordability,
sustainability, transparency, and accountability.”189
The government remained cautiously optimistic as the
program came to an end, with strong hope that the industry
could learn from past mistakes and simplify the modification
process.190 “According to the agencies, other pieces of the
infrastructure supported by MHA and HAMP, such as
requirements to offer post-modification counseling, third-party
escalation centers, and public reporting of modification and
servicer performance will also be phased out, or provided on a
limited basis depending on investor or servicer.”191 The Treasury
has since created a series of measures for the years following the
184 See supra Section II.A.
185 Ben Lane, Obama Administration Presents a Look at Life After HAMP,
HOUSINGWIRE (July 25, 2016), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/37608-obama-
administration-presents-a-look-at-life-after-hamp [https://perma.cc/EG9V-MJER].
186 Bob Sullivan,What Happens When HAMP Expires at the End of This Year?,
CREDIT.COM (Aug. 4, 2016), http://blog.credit.com/2016/08/what-should-life-after-hamp-
look-like-153247/ [https://perma.cc/32NC-MY68].
187 Lane, supra note 185.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 See Sullivan, supra note 186; See also Life After HAMP—The Future of Loss
Mitigation, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N (Sept. 2016), https://www.mba.org/issues/residential-
issues/one-mod-a-post-hamp-loan-modification [https://perma.cc/HM3E-FVUZ].
191 Lane, supra note 185.
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expiration of HAMP. The programs, in the process of being
implemented, include “a principal reduction alternative, a first
and second lien modification program, and post modification
counseling, [which will lend] assist[ance to] struggling borrowers
and prevent them from defaulting or [in some cases] re-
defaulting.”192 The government did not seem concerned with the
end of HAMP and expressed high hope for the planned measures
following HAMP’s end. A program viewed largely as a complete
failure paves an even rockier road for the time period following.
V. SOLUTIONS TOHAMP
A. Non-HAMP Alternatives
A significant issue HAMP faced during its lifetime was
the fact that it was not only implementing a program, but it was
also trying to fix the mortgage business. One proposed solution
is “eliminat[ing] government-sponsored Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, which currently own or guarantee nine out of every
[ten] new mortgages on behalf of the government.”193
Eliminating the two dominant mortgage holders in the industry
would place the “responsibility for buying mortgages and
packaging them into [sellable] bundles” on “private financial
firms.”194 Keeping both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the
market is allowing them, and essentially the government, to
shoulder the majority of the risk of new mortgages.195 This
solution is flawed, however, because allowing private investors
to shoulder the burden is what brought on the mortgage crisis in
the first place. The key is to spread the burden and regulate the
market, preventing private investors from making unrealistic
investments in thousands of mortgages that are likely to fail.
Careful regulation may reduce the chances of a future mortgage
crisis; however, a program designed with the average American
borrower in mind is what will alleviate the current problem.
B. Rebuilding HAMP from the Ground Up
Much of HAMP, as well as other past initiatives, has
lacked core principles such as efficiency, affordability,
192 Brian Honea, Treasury Looks to the Future as HAMPWinds Down, DSNEWS
(Mar. 16, 2016, 3:46 PM), http://www.dsnews.com/news/03-16-2016/treasury-looks-to-
the-future-as-hamp-winds-down [https://perma.cc/BNS5-V3D6].
193 Dayen, supra note 9.
194 Id.
195 See id.
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accessibility, accountability, and enforceability.196 These five
values should form the foundation of most, if not all, government
programs designed to better the general welfare and assist those
in need. Building a foundation upon these principles will lend
greater support to the main goal of HAMP: effectiveness.
As of June 30, 2015, “$18.5 billion . . . remain[ed]
unspent and available for HAMP [initiatives].”197 This amount is
not only significant, it is adequate to fund a new program with
the same goals as the original HAMP, but with a reinvented
foundation built upon applicable principles. These funds were
allocated for the development and implementation of HAMP;
however, due likely in part to HAMP failing to reach the three
to four million homeowners promised by the Treasury,
significant funds have been left unused.198 A solution to the
problems that HAMP has poorly addressed, primarily financial
difficulties, will require substantial capital. Sufficient unused
capital already budgeted by the Treasury will allow a solution,
or a combination of solutions, to be seamlessly integrated
without the need for additional funding from Congress.
A key element to an effective program is efficiency. Not
only does efficiency reduce unneeded expenditures, it also
creates ease on both ends of the transaction for both the
borrowers and the lenders.199 “Loan modifications must be
mandated for qualified homeowners facing hardship where the
modification also produces more income for the investor than
foreclosure.”200 Additionally, the “modification evaluation should
be completed [prior to] foreclosure,” and if foreclosure has
already been initiated before the homeowner applied for a loan
modification, then “the foreclosure should be paused.”201
Initiating the modification evaluation prior to commencing
foreclosure will prevent the homeowner and servicer from
incurring foreclosure fees in a situation where foreclosure may
never occur.202 Avoiding these unnecessary fees would better
serve the parties by allocating those funds towards the
modification plan. Additionally, homeowners typically oppose
foreclosures, creating litigation that further depletes resources
196 See COHEN, COHEN& THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 6−9.
197 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTORGEN., supra note 149, at 99.
198 See Jacobs, supra note 31, at 274; see alsoOFFICE OF THESPECIAL INSPECTOR
GEN., supra note 149, at 99.
199 COHEN, COHEN& THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 53.
200 Id. at 6.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 54.
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that could be allocated towards curing the initial issue—a
defaulted mortgage.203
Ensuring a modification evaluation is carried out in a timely
manner will educate the homeowner on the reality of the situation,
allowing them to understand whether foreclosure is the correct
option or if a loan modification will allow them to remain without
the risk of re-defaulting. This will not only speed up themodification
evaluation, but it will prevent the servicer from pouring more
resources into a foreclosure that may not ever occur.204
Affordability on a national scale is essential to the
solution. The little success HAMP has had is primarily through
reducing re-default rates of its successful modifications. Keeping
re-default rates low is essential to any loan modification
program’s success. “National standards should follow HAMP’s
template by requiring affordable monthly payments and
prioritizing interest rate reduction and principal forgiveness for
long-term sustainability.”205 Allowing access to a loan
modification is only the first piece of the puzzle. Lenders must
be tasked with correctly determining adequate payment plans
that limit the chances of re-default by the homeowner and are
fair to both the homeowner and the lender.206 Throughout the
mortgage crisis, lenders have been viewed negatively as a result
of ignoring HAMP’s guidelines and foreclosing on American
homes.207 Rather than acting solely with their own interests in
mind, lenders should approach homeowners as teammates,
ready to assist them and with the goal of establishing affordable
plans that are favorable and realistic for both parties. Re-
defaulting not only creates hardships for the homeowners, but
also results in foreclosure which can lead to significant troubles
for lenders.208 Lenders continue to face many hardships when
foreclosing upon homes, leading one to believe that foreclosure
is not in the lenders’ best interest.209
Throughout its duration, HAMP exemplified a program
built with barriers, heavily restricting its accessibility. These
superficial “barriers [have excluded] access for many
homeowners [such as] those with second mortgage debt,
extended unemployment, [and] subsequent hardships after
203 See id. at 53−55.
204 See id.
205 Id. at 12.
206 Dayen, supra note 147.
207 See id.; see also supra Part II.
208 See Christopher K. Odinet, Banks, Break-ins, and Bad Actors in Mortgage
Foreclosure, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1155, 1166 (2015).
209 See id.
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modification.”210 Additionally, HAMP failed to adequately reach
populations such as those lacking English proficiency.211
“Reaching homeowners in need requires expansive eligibility
rules and additional assistance for certain populations.”212
The mortgage crisis hit the nation as a whole, yet HAMP
did not address the crisis on the same scale. In order to reach
the millions of people the Treasury promised but failed to reach,
homeowners across the nation must be educated about their
rights and informed of the actions they can take to avoid
foreclosure. The burden of educating homeowners must be
placed on both lenders and servicers who have direct lines of
communication with the struggling homeowners. Technological
advances in communication and the spread of information
should be utilized by the Treasury and lenders to reach the
population that has been ignored throughout the lifetime of
HAMP. For example, lenders and servicers should be required
to hold both in-person and video conference outreach programs
where homeowners can meet one-on-one with mortgage
servicers. Such in-person programs were not held in six of the
ten states most underserved by HAMP, even though previous
outreach events demonstrated success.213 The Office of the
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
recommended that “the Treasury [ ] hold additional and
sustained public service campaigns . . . in all major cities and
high foreclosure cities within the 10 HAMP-underserved
states.”214 Additionally, servicers and lenders should be required
to hold similar informative campaigns in order to receive the
financial benefits included in HAMP participation.
A significant issue with the HAMP process was that once
homeowners filed for a modification, they were often left unsure
of their statuses. The “Treasury should hold servicers
accountable for extensive delays, lost paperwork, and errors in
calculating key eligibility factors such as income.”215 A lack of
transparency between servicers and homeowners was prevalent
during HAMP’s lifespan. Often homeowners were assigned TPPs
only to find out at the end of the TPPs that they were denied
permanent modification.216 Both transparency and accountability
throughout the loan modification process are essential to a
210 COHEN, COHEN& THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 6.
211 See id. at 60.
212 Id. at 6.
213 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTORGEN., supra note 149, at 57.
214 Id. at 58.
215 Swanson, supra note 164.
216 See supra Section II.B.
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successful program. Servicers should be held accountable to
homeowners, ensuring that the homeowner is aware of what
actions they are taking and when these actions are being made.
The need for congressional mandates is essential:
Without strong mandates and real consequences for noncompliance,
servicers will continue to implement modifications haphazardly or not
at all, leaving the economy in a tailspin. Eligible homeowners must be
able to rely directly on national servicing standards to save their
homes from avoidable foreclosures.217
Real consequences would include measures such as reducing the
“bonuses” received by lenders that are paid out when permanent
modifications are made;218 as well as increasing fees and fines
levied upon lenders that fail to comply or choose to implement
abusive tactics that stretch the boundaries of the implemented
guidelines. A lack of accountability results in a lack of protection,
in this case, protection for the participants in which the program
was designed.219 Holding lenders accountable will lend strength
to a reinvented and newly implementedHAMPprogram, allowing
for greater overall effectiveness and therefore noticeable
improvement to the lingering housing crisis.
Courts were (and, regarding any lingering litigation since
the end of the program, still are) left to interpret the guidelines
of HAMP and enforce what they find the program supports.220
Homeowners should not be required to bring costly litigation and
fill the courts’ dockets with disputes revolving around loan
modifications. These homeowners turned to HAMP due to
financial difficulties and, therefore, likely lack the funds needed
to hire adequate representation. Therefore, homeowners should
have the right to appeal modification decisions and obtain
independent review of their applications. Furthermore, the
guidelines established by the Treasury should be converted to
mandates in exchange for the billions of dollars the Treasury has
made available to banks and servicers.221 A task force or current
government agency should be expanded and tasked to ensure that
the billions of dollars in American taxes are used in an effective
manner and any noncompliance is rigorously enforced. Given the
level of authority the Treasury possesses, it should exercise its
“power to permanently withhold TARP incentive payments from
217 COHEN, COHEN& THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 4.
218 See Making Home Affordable, supra note 5.
219 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTORGEN., supra note 149, at 59.
220 See supra Part II.
221 SeeMerle, supra note 16; see also Robinson, supra note 21.
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servicers who fail to [comply.]”222 Additionally, regulators should
review servicing practices by posing as fictional homeowners
attempting to apply for modification; this could assist in
maintaining a higher level of compliance and overall effectiveness
of the program.223 If the Treasury continues to fail in standing
firmly and authoritatively behind its own programs, lenders and
“servicers will have no reason to change.”224
CONCLUSION
The U.S. recession destroyed the housing market and left
the economy in shambles. The federal government was faced with
one of the most serious structural problems the United States had
ever faced. The federal government attempted to mask the severe
and growing mortgage crisis with the issuance of weak mortgage
servicing standards through the establishment of HAMP. The
HAMP program was only an attempt at solving the ongoing
mortgage crisis. The economy may be improving, but foreclosures
are still occurring at an alarming rate.
The judicial system gave HAMP the strength the federal
government failed to provide.225 It is not the duty of the courts to
create law, but rather it is the duty of Congress to create laws
that are effective at solving the issues they face. Now that
HAMP has ended, there still exists a grave need for meaningful
federal action on loan modifications. “Swift adoption of strong
national servicing standards could still save many homes,
preserve investments, and transform the servicing industry for
the betterment of the market for decades to come.”226 The choice
is left to the federal government. It can look at HAMP as its best
effort or it can reinvent and reestablish the program by utilizing
efficient programs that are not only accessible to the nation as a
whole but hold lenders accountable for their actions. Through
the adoption of strong national mortgage servicing standards,
the mortgage crisis will finally be beaten in more ways than one.
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